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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FREEDOM YOCUM, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20050671-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in her treatment of the victim \ ersus 
the defendant in relation to the exhibits utilized during trial? This issue was not preserved 
but should be reviewed for obvious and harmful error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 5L ^ j | 6-
7. 4P.3d778. 
Alternatively, this issue should be reviewed to determine whether Yocum was 
denied his constitutional right to competent counsel when counsel failed to object to the 
trial court's actions. A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of 
counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal 
question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 
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1995). To establish a claim of ineffective counsel defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory or constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Freedom Yocum appeals from the judgment sentence, and commitment of the 
Third District Court after he was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Freedom Yocum was charged by Information filed in Third District Court on 
March 16, 2004, with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-103 (R. 1). 
On March 7. 2005, a jury trial was held under the direction of the Honorable Leslie 
A. Lewis (R. 110-11, 224). Yocum was found guilty of aggravated assault, after the jury 
deliberated for an hour and a half (R. I l l , 224:131). Defendant was ordered to report to 
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for the preparation of a pre-sentence report. (R. 152, 
224:133). 
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On April 29. 2005, Yocum was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. The prison term was suspended, (R. 157). and 
the defendant was placed on probation to be supervised by AP&P for 36 months. The 
defendant was fined $950.00, plus interest (R. 158). Under the Probation Conditions, 
Yocum was inter alia required to abstain from using, consuming, or possessing alcohol or 
illegal drugs, violate no laws, obtain a GED, complete anger management classes, and 
have no contact with the victim (R. 159). 
On May 6, 2005, Yocum filed a Motion for New Trial in the Third-District Court, 
(R. 165), and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for New 
Trial (R. 161-163). A hearing to argue the Motion for New Trial was held on June 22. 
2005, before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis (R. 200, 226). On June 29, 2005, the Court 
denied the defendant's Motion for New Trial (R. 202). 
On July 19. 2005, Yocum filed a Notice of Appeal in the Third District Court (R. 
208). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Richard Matsumura 
Richard Matsumura lives at 598 West Fourth Avenue, Midvale, Utah, which is 
located in Salt Lake County (R. 224:13). 
Matsumura testified that on March 15, 2004, at approximately 11:30 a.m., he was 
cutting some weeds that were on the outside of his back yard near the street (R. 224:14). 
Freedom Yocum approached Matsumura and said, "Give me the money, you mother 
fucker" (R. 224:15). Yocum was referring to the $80 dollars that he claimed Matsumura 
owed him for a used tiller that Matsumura had borrowed from him three years before and 
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allegedly returned broken (R. 224:15, 16, 21). Matsumura has known Yocum for about 
five or six years (R. 224:16). Matsumura was acquainted with Yocum's wife, Edna, and 
had a cordial relationship with her (R. 224:16-17). 
Matsumura testified that as Yocum was demanding the money, he took a garden 
tool, a cultivator, and started raising it (R. 224:17). Yocum was standing about five feet 
away when the incident began (R. 224:32). Yocum swung the cultivator at Matsumura 
four or five times (R. 224:17, 34). Yocum connected one time with Matsumura and 
scratched him on the inside of his right arm (R. 224:17). Matsumura was handed the 
shears that he used to cut the grass and protect himself (R. 224:18-19). Matsumura 
demonstrated with the sheers how he defended himself by raising the shears above his 
head (R. 224:19). Matsumura was then asked to identify the cultivator that Yocum used 
during the incident (R. 224:19). Matsumura found the cultivator in a grassy area of his 
back yard about two days after the incident (R. 224:20). Matsumura could not 
definitively identify the cultivator showed to him in the courtroom as the one that Yocum 
used during the incident (R. 224:20), 
Matsumura testified that after Yocum swung the cultivator at him a few times, a 
truck approached the area (R. 224:21). Matsumura saw the truck and inade Yocum aware 
of the possibility of witnesses (R. 224:21). At that time, Yocum stopped swinging the 
cultivator and Matsumura was able to leave the area (R. 224:22). Matsumura went into 
his home and called 911 (R. 224:21). Matsumura testified that the police responded 
quickly (R. 224:29). 
Matsumura then identified several still frames that were taken from a videotape 
that was presented by the State as a tape that was taken from Matsumura*s home 
surveillance system (R. 224:25). There are seven cameras total in the surveillance system 
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(R. 224:38). Malsumura also identified several pictures of the cut on his right arm (R. 
224:27). 
The court then received State exhibits 1-8, including the shears and culth ator (R. 
224:28). At that time, the judge allowed the jurors to examine the tools (R. 224:28). 
Matsumura then testified that he went to Edna Yocum's place of business on 
March 16, 2004, the day after the incident, to apologize for calling the police and ask her 
about what Freedom said about the whole incident (R. 224:29). Matsumura did not feel 
bad that he had called the police on Freedom; rather he was concerned for Edna Yocum 
because he felt she was a good person and she didn't really have anything to do v ith the 
incident (R. 224:30). 
Matsumura testified that he could not remember at what angle the cultivator was 
held by Yocum (R. 224:32). The court suggested that Matsumura demonstrate with the 
cultivator (R. 224:32). Matsumura then demonstrated that Yocum was holding the 
cultivator at a 45-degree angle (R. 224:33). Matsumura could not remember how many 
hands Yocum used to hold the cultivator, because he was looking more at the prongs than 
at Yocum's hands (R. 224:33). Matsumura testified that the shears and the cultivator 
connected wood on wood; rather than metal because he would have heard more of a click 
(R. 224:34). Matsumura testified that he did not swing at Yocum and that he only used 
the shears to protect his head (R. 224:34). 
Matsumura testified that paramedics were called to his home (R. 224:36). The 
paramedics irrigated the cut and advised Matsumura to go to a first aid care station (R. 
224:36). Matsumura did not go to a first aid care station, because after talking to the 
paramedics he decided it was a surface wound (R. 224:36). The cut was not bandaged by 
cither Matsumura or the paramedics and the cut healed normally (R. 224:36). 
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B. Testimony of Detective Brian Todd 
Brian Todd is a detective with the Midvale City Police. Todd has been involved in 
law enforcement for eight years and has an Associates Degree in criminal justice. Todd is 
currently assigned as a resource officer to the elementary and middle schools in the City 
of Midvale (R. 224:41). 
On March 15, 2004, Todd was assigned to patrol and was dispatched on a call to 
the Matsumura home (R. 224:41-42). Todd was the first officer to arrive and he spoke to 
the victim, Richard (R. 224:42). Todd observed that Matsumura"s shirt was torn and that 
he had an injury to his upper right bicep area (R. 224:42). Todd was informed by 
Matsumura that Freedom had attacked him. After verifying that Freedom referred to 
Freedom Yocum, a neighbor, Todd asked where Yocum was at the current time. 
Matsumura informed him that Yocum had left, so Todd found out what vehicle he had 
left in and contacted dispatch with the information so that assisting officers could help 
locate the suspect vehicle (R. 224:43). 
Todd testified that the only garden tool he saw at the time was a pair of shears 
owned by Matsumura (R. 224:43). Todd did not take pictures of the shears or take the 
shears into police evidence (R. 224:44). 
After determining that Matsumura's injury was only a minor laceration and a 
puncture wound, Todd did not immediately call an ambulance, because he did not feel the 
injury was life threatening (R. 224:44-45). 
C. Testimony of Officer Greg Wathen 
Greg Wathen is an officer with the Midvale City Police Department. Wathen has 
been an officer for almost 20 years, 18 of which have been with Midvale City, and is an 
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instructor in the department for several things, including pathogens and firearms. Wathen 
is a graduate of the Crime Scene Academy of Utah. Wathen was a detective for five 
years and had been a field training office acting as shift sergeant (R. 224:46). 
On March 15, 2004, Wathen responded to assist Todd at 598 West Fourth Avenue 
in Midvale City (R. 224:46-47). When Wathen arrived on the scene he saw Todd and 
Matsumura outside, just east of the residence (R. 224:47). Wathen was informed that the 
suspect had fled the scene in a vehicle, so he left to go see if he could locate the suspect 
(R 224:47). 
Wathen knew Yocum by sight (R. 224:47). Wathen left the resident and headed 
east up Center Street in Midvale toward State Street (R. 224:48). Wathen saw the suspect 
vehicle leave the roadway and pull into a parking lot of a business. The business was 
about five blocks from the scene of the incident (R. 224:51). Wathen pulled in behind 
him with his red emergency lights on and approached the suspect as if it were a regular 
traffic stop (R. 224:48). Yocum exited his vehicle and began to walk into the business he 
had parked in front of when Wathen called him back and told him that he was stopping 
him because it w7as alleged that he'd just committed a serious assault against someone (R. 
224:48). Yocum"s response was that he had not been involved in any kind of an assault. 
Wathen informed Yocum that he would be detained for a few minutes (R. 224:48). 
Wathen informed Yocum that a neighbor had reported to the police that he'd just been 
assaulted with a yard rake or similar type tool (R. 224:49). Wathen then asked if Yocum 
had anything like that in his vehicle and asked for permission to search Yocum"s vehicle 
(R. 224:49). Yocum immediately stepped away from the vehicle, held the door open, and 
told Wathen he could search the vehicle (R. 224:49). Another office had arrived on the 
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scene to assist and both officers looked inside the vehicle (R. 224:49). The officers did 
not find the tool (R. 224:49). 
Wathen testified that at the time of the stop, Yocum was wearing a gray, sleeveless 
t-shirt, Levi pants, and a pair of moon boots (R. 224:50). 
Wathen witnessed Yocum walking on March 15, 2004, but did not see him limping 
or carrying a walking cane (R. 224:91). 
D. Testimony of Detective Chad Egan 
Chad Egan is a detective with the Midvale City Police. Egan has been employed 
with Midvale City for nine years, three years as a detective and six years as a patrol 
officer (R. 224:53). Egan currently investigates auto theft, arson and vice incidents, prior 
to that he investigated burglaries and other assaults. Egan is also a firearm instructor and 
a driving instructor for the police department (R. 224:54). 
On March 15, 2004, Egan was assigned as the investigator on an aggravated 
assault between Freedom Yocum and Richard Matsumura (R. 224:54). When the officers 
brought Matsumura into the station, Egan interviewed him (R. 224:54-55). Egan also 
found out that the incident had been caught on tape, so he watched the tape and was 
listening to Matsumura's testimony, when he was notified that they had taken Yocum into 
custody (R. 224:55). 
Egan read Yocum his Miranda rights and began to question him about the incident. 
Yocum asked if he needed an attorney, Egan said that was up to him. Yocum agreed to 
go ahead and talk to Egan. Yocum denied that he'd been in any altercation with 
Matsumura. Egan advised Yocum that they had the incident on videotape and that he was 
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wearing the same clothes on the videotape that he was currently wearing (R. 224:55). 
Yocum continued to deny being involved in any altercation (R. 224:56). 
Yocum was booked into jail for the aggravated assault charges (R. 224:56). The 
garden tools were not collected by Egan or booked into evidence at am time (R. 224:56). 
Egan obtained the tools the Friday before the trial from Matsumura. Egan testified that he 
was not sure that the cultivator presented was the one in the actual assault (R. 224:57). 
Egan witnessed Yocum walking on March 15, 2004, but did not see him limping 
or carrying a walking cane (R. 224:74). 
E. Testimony of Freedom Yocum 
Prior to the testimony of Freedom Yocum the court requested that the pieces of 
equipment be put on the clerk's desk. The court offered to have the bailiff move them or 
defense counsel. The court also addressed Yocum and told him to stop where he was to 
be sworn in (R. 224:58). 
Yocum testified that he is current unemployed because he was invohed in a car 
accident in 1981 and he is still getting over the injuries. Yocum explained that he limps 
because he received nerve damage during the accident (R. 224:59). 
Yocum testified that on March 15, 2004, he went to a retaining wall along the 
railroad tracks to plant, rake and clean up. On his way to the wall, he saw Richard 
Matsumura. Yocum called Matsumura a few names, such as pervert, and told him that he 
owed him money for the tiller he had borrowed and damaged (R. 224:60). Yocum felt 
that Matsumura owned him $350 to $400 for the tiller repair (R. 224:61). 
Yocum testified that Matsumura came after him with the shears (R. 224:61). 
When defense counsel attempted to have Yocum demonstrate how Matsumura was 
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holding the shears, the court ordered defense counsel to hold them, not Yocum (R. 
224:62). 
Yocum testified that Matsumura approached him with shears that were red and 
twice the size of the ones in the courtroom (R. 224:63). Yocum testified that he had a 
rake that had four prongs on it that were twice as long as the prongs on the tool that was 
in the courtroom and that the handle was about four-and-a-half feet long (R. 224:69). 
Yocum did not want Matsumura to get behind him, so he moved against the wall. Yocum 
testified that he was trying to get away. Yocum also testified that he threw his rake in 
Matsumura's yard and then he walked to his house (R. 224:62). After getting a drink, 
Yocum got in his van to pick up his walking cane that he had dropped off three days prior 
to the incident (R. 224:65, 72). 
Yocum testified that he remembered shaking the stick at Matsumura and saying he 
ought to "stick this up your ass," (R. 224:64), but that he did not remember hitting him 
with it at all (R. 224:64). Yocum testified that he did not think that he had struck 
Matsumura or that this altercation was minor and no big deal (R. 224:67). 
Yocum testified that he had not been using drugs or alcohol on March 15, 2004 (R. 
224:72). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Yocum asserts that the trial court committed obvious and harmful error at trial in 
her treatment of the victim in this matter versus the defendant. As a result Yocum was 
denied his right to due process in that the trial court's actions created an atmosphere of 
bias against Yocum and also undercut his presumption of innocence. Alternatively, 
Yocum asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to competent counsel when 
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counsel failed to make any timely or contemporaneous objections to the trial court's sua 
sponte comments and actions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AT TRIAL IN 
HER TREATMENT OF THE VICTIM IN THIS MATTER VERSUS HER 
TREATMENT OF THE DEFENDANT. YOCUM WAS ALSO DENIED HIS 
RIGHT TO COMPETENT COUNSEL WHEN NO CONTEMPORANEOUS 
OBJECTION WAS MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDUCT 
A. The trial court's erroneous and improper actions constituted plain error. 
Yocum asserts that the trial court committed obvious and harmful error at trial in 
her treatment of the victim in this matter versus the defendant. The trial court encouraged 
the victim to handle the trial exhibits and to use the exhibits for demonstration purposes. 
However, the trial court forbade the defendant from handling am of the same exhibits. 
The trial court also questioned the defendant and accused him of making a threat against 
the victim. As a result Yocum was denied his right to due process in that the trial court's 
actions created an atmosphere of bias against Yocum and also undercut his constitutional 
presumption of innocence. 
During the trial the victim, Matsumura, was encouraged to handle the garden tools 
at issue and to use them for demonstration purposes. For example, during his testimony 
he was handed the shears that he testified he used to cut the grass and protect himself (R. 
224:18-19). Matsumura demonstrated with the sheers how he defended himself by 
raising the shears above his head (R. 224:19). 
Similarly, during cross examination, Matsumura was asked about what angle 
Yocum was holding the cultivator above his head (R. 224: 32). Upon this question, the 
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trial court, sua sponte, made the following statement: "Why don't you let the witness 
demonstrate?" (R. 224: 32). After which, Matsumura was again allowed to handle the 
exhibit and use it demonstratively. 
Conversely, immediately prior to the defendant's testimom the trial court made the 
following statement: 
Mr Yocum, if you'd come forward and be sworn. 
Where are the pieces of equipment? I'd like them put on my clerk's desk. 
r i l have the bailiff move them, or you can move them if you want, Mr. Heineman. 
Mr. Yocum, you need to stop where you are and be sworn. 
(R. 224: 58). 
In addition, during direct examination Yocum was asked about howr Matsumura 
held and approached him with the shears (R. 224: 61). Yocum answered the question 
with, "Well he [Matsumura] had a pair of shears, a red pair of shears, like this one here, 
and the red handle-" (R. 224: 62). But instead of being able to demonstrate with the 
shears, the Court again, sua sponte, interjected with the following comment "You hold 
them, counsel" (Id.). 
Yocum went on the testify that Matsumura was coming towards him and that he 
held up something and said "stick this up your ass and stuff like that, you know" (R. 224: 
63). At this point the following exchange occurred between the defendant and the trial 
court: 
The Court: And what were you referring to? 
The Witness: Pardon? 
The Court: What were you referring to? 
The Witness: That claw thing. 
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The Court: You had that claw thing? 
The Witness: Yeah. And in order to-
The Court: And you threatened to-
The Witness: I-no, I wasn't threatening him I was saying. 1 ought to stick 
this up your ass, you know, again, and just took it and threw it 
in his yard and walked off. 
The Court: I see. 
The Witness: Thafs the only thing 1 did that I remember 
(R. 224: 63-64). 
Defense counsel made no contemporaneous objections to any of the trial court's 
sua sponte comments or in regards to her treatment of the defendant as opposed to the 
victim. Instead, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial v\hich raised the issue. 
The trial court denied this motion on preservation grounds. During the hearing on the 
motion for new trial however, the trial court made the following statement: 
But you can't correct the fact that you did not raise the issue at trial. Had 
you raised the issue at trial I could have dealt with the issue at trial. You do not 
put a loaded firearm in front of the defendant and leave it there throughout trial. A 
claw that could have been used to hit me in the face, it was a very long rake, with 
claws at the end, is not something I wanted sitting in the courtroom on the witness 
stand for the duration of the trial. I viewed it as a dangerous weapon. And hence. 
asked to have it moved back over, with all the other exhibits, in front of my clerk 
(R. 226: 6-7). 
Yocum asserts that the trial court committed obvious and harmful error at trial in 
her treatment of the victim in this matter versus the defendant. All of the comments and 
13 
actions taken by the trial court in this regard were done sua sponte. The trial court 
encouraged the victim to handle the trial exhibits and to use the exhibits for 
demonstration purposes. However, the trial court forbade the defendant from handling 
any of the same exhibits. As a result Yocum was denied his right to due process in that 
the trial court's actions created an atmosphere of bias and also undercut his constitutional 
presumption of innocence. This issue was not timely preserved but should be reviewed 
for obvious and harmful error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ^ 6-7, 4 P.3d 778. 
6fcA defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a neutral and detached magistrate." 
People v. Convert 194 Mich. App. 395, 398, 487 N.W.2d 787, — (1992). "A trial court 
pierces the veil of judicial impartiality if the court's comments or conduct unduly bias or 
influence the jury, thus preventing the defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial." 
People v. Paquette. 214 Mich. App. 336, 340, 543 N.W.2d 342, — 1995), cert denied, 
557 N.W.2d 315 (Mich. 1996). Yocum asserts that the trial court's comments and actions 
pierced the veil of judicial impartiality and prevented him from receiving a fair and 
impartial trial. 
Similarly, the trial court's actions further impinged upon Yocum's right to due 
process by undercutting his presumption of innocence. In State v. MitchelU 824 P.2d 469, 
473 (Utah App. 1991), this Court stated: 
It is well established that "[a] principal ingredient of due process is that every 
criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial." A criminal defendant's 
right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Further, n[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the 
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal 
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justice." It necessarily follows from this that a criminal defendant ib generally 
entitled to the "physical indicia of innocence." 
(citations omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has likewise commented: 
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the 
accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies 
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may 
undemiine the fairness of the factfinding process. In the administration of criminal 
justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guih is to 
be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
The actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot 
always be fully determined. But this Court has left no doubt that the probability of 
deleterious effects on fundamental rights call for close judicial scrutiny. Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Courts must 
do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based 
on reason, principle, and common human experience. 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976) (holding it unconstitutional to compel 
defendants to appear at trial in inmate clothing). 
In this case the trial court's disparate treatment of the victim versus the defendant 
in regards to handling the exhibits for demonstration purposes undermined the factfinding 
process and impinged upon YocunTs presumption of innocence by creating a clear 
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implication to the jury that he-as opposed to the victim-was dangerous and not to be 
trusted. The trial court validated this bias in her comments made during the motion for a 
new trial that the defendant could have used "the claw" to hit her in the face (R. 226: 7). 
In addition, the trial court's verbal comment to the defendant that he "threatened" the 
victim again created the clear implication to the jury that the defendant had. in fact, 
committed the crime. 
Yocum also asserts that the impropriety of the trial court's actions and 
comments-all made sua sponte and in front of the jury-should have been obvious to the 
trial court. The trial court is in an ''advantaged position... to determine the impact of 
events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings/' State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 
20, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted). In addition, it is the duty of the trial court to recognize 
her role as a "neutral and detached magistrate." Conyers, 194 Mich. App. at 398. 
Moreover. Canon 1 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct reads in part: "An 
independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable in our society. A judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and shall personally observe, high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved/9 Similarly, Canon 2(A) of the same code reads: "A judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary/9 
Accordingly, Yocum asserts that the trial court's error in its inappropriate and 
disparate treatment of the defendant which impinged upon his right to due process and 
fundamental fairness by creating an atmosphere of bias that had the effect of undercutting 
his presumption of innocence, was obvious because of the trial court's statutory and 
constitutional duty to impartially administer justice and to be "alert to factors that may 
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undermine the fairness of the factfinding process. Esiellc v Williams. 425 U.S. at 503-
04. 
In reviewing an issue under the plain error standard, this Court will only reverse if 
the obvious error was also harmful. Slate v Parker, 2000 UT 51. ^ 7, 4 P.3d 778. For an 
error to be harmful the defendant must establish that absent the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. In Parker, the defendant was tried for 
murder for inflicting multiple stab wounds on the victim with a fi\ e inch knife. 2000 UT 
51 at ^ 2. 4. The trial court during voir dire engaged in a discussion with a potential 
juror regarding knives. 2000 UT 51 at % 4. The trial court showed the jur\ his own 
pocket knife and commented that his knife was "probably as thick a pocket knife that a 
fellow really ought to carry." Id. This Court concluded that the judge's comment was not 
proper but not harmful or prejudicial because ta*any improper impressions created b) the 
trial judge's comments" were remedied by the court's instruction to the jury that they "not 
be influenced by any statement which they may have interpreted as indicating the trial 
court's views on the evidence." 2000 UT 51 at ^ 6. 8. 
In this case the jury was similarly instructed about their role as fact finders and that 
they should not interpret any statements or rulings of the court as an indication that the 
court has an opinion as to the facts or evidence (R.95). However, this case differs from 
that of Parker in that the trial courts actions and comments went not to her opinion as to 
the evidence in the case but as to her opinion as to the parties. The trial court's comments 
aligned himself with the purported victim by highlighting to the jury his wife's 
employment with the victim. The trial court's comments also maligned the defendant by 
attacking him for his perceived behavior in the presence of the jury. 
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The California Supreme Court has stated that wThe propriety and prejudicial effect 
of a particular comment are judged by both its content and by the circumstances in which 
il was made." People v Melton, 44 Cal.3d 713, 735, 750 P.2d 741, — (Cal.), cert 
denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 329, 102 L.Ed.2d 346 (1988). Yocum asserts that an 
examination of both the content of the statements and the circumstances highlights the 
prejudicial effect of the trial court's statements. In this case, the jury had to decide who 
instigated the altercation and whether or not self-defense justified an) action b) either 
party. Yocum asserts that the trial court's actions and comments conveyed lo the jury that 
he was volatile and not to be trusted whereas the victim was not dangerous and 
trustworthy thus making it more likely that the jury would find him to be the aggressor. 
Yocum asserts that without this improper action by the trial court, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result. 
B. Trial counsel's failure to contemporaneously object to the trial court's 
conduct deprived Yocum of his right to competent counsel. 
At trial, defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object at any time to the trial 
court's erroneous (sua sponte) conduct. Yocum asserts that this failure rendered counsel 
incompetent and deprived him of the likelihood of a more favorable result. 
A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel 
falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal question 
of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel it is the defendant's burden 
to show that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonslrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
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and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473. 477 (Utah 
App. 1989). As demonstrated above, the trial court's conduct was inappropriate and 
deprived Yocum of his right to an impartial magistrate, due process, and his presumption 
of innocence. 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial defense counsel argued that the trial 
court's actions constituted plain error. Counsel stated: iCAt that particular time, it was 
clear to me that the Court did not want Mr. Yocum handling the tools and I wasn't 
intending on having him do that. I thought that if I objected at that time, any admonition 
the Court would have given just would stressed the point and would have left it in the 
jurors' mind and I don't think it would have cured any of the damage caused..." (R. 226: 
6). 
However. Yocum asserts that had his counsel immediately taken action after the 
trial court's statement that the tools were to be removed from his presence then the 
situation could have been corrected and he would not have been subjected to any further 
inappropriate and disparate treatment by the trial court. Defense counsel could have 
quietly brought this issue to the attention of the trial court and then asked that the matter 
be discussed outside the presence of the jury. Then a remedy could have been fashioned 
that would have alleviated any safety concerns had by the judge without disparate 
treatment to the defendant through action or comment. Accordingly, Yocum asserts that 
counsel's failure to contemporaneously object or raise this issue constituted deficient 
performance. In addition, but for this failure, Yocum asserts-for the same reasons argued 
above-that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth above, Yocum asks that this Court reverse his conviction 
for aggravated assault and remand the matter back to the Third District Court for a new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of March. 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854. Salt Lake City. UT 84114, this 3rd day of March. 2005. 
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ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (54 81) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, : MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
V. : 
FREEDOM YOCUM, : Case No.041901738 FS 
Honorable LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Defendant. : 
Defendant FREEDOM YOCUM, by and through counsel Robert K. 
Heineman, submits this memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of his motion for new trial. 
FACTS 
At trial, victim Richard Matsumura was the State's 
primary witness. The state introduced a garden claw and a set of 
pruning shears as representative of the garden implements possessed 
by the participants in the altercation at issue. Through the 
course of his testimony, Mr. Matsumura was permitted to demonstrate 
what occurred using these exhibits. 
As defendant Freedom Yocum was taking the stand in the 
presence of the jury, the trial court commented that he was not to 
be permitted to demonstrate using these exhibits during the course 
of his testimony. 
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Defendant asserted that Matsumura was the aggressor, and 
he acted in self defense. 
ARGUMENT 
Article I, section 7 of the State Constitution, in 
conjunction with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution, guarantee an accused defendant due process. A 
defendant is presumed to be innocent. The trial court's direction 
in the presence of the jury that Mr. Yocum was not to be permitted 
to handle the garden implements deprived him of due process, a fair 
trial, and undercut the presumption of innocence. 
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence 
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law." 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
To implement the presumption, courts must be 
alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the 
factfinding process. In the administration of criminal 
justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of 
the principle that guilt is to be established by 
probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
The actual impact of a particular practice on 
the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined. 
But this Court has left no doubt that the probability of 
deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close 
judicial scrutiny. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) . Courts must do the 
best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a 
particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and 
common human experience. 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-4 (1976) (holding it 
unconstitutional to compel defendants to appear at trial in inmate 
clothing). 
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Here, the alleged victim was permitted to demonstrate 
using the garden tools. Defendant was denied that opportunity in 
the presence of the jury. The clear implication the jury likely 
drew is that defendant is dangerous and not to be trusted with 
potentially dangerous items. By allowing the alleged victim to 
demonstrate, the jury got the message that the alleged victim is 
not dangerous and can be trusted with potentially dangerous items. 
In assessing who instigated the altercation, these inadvertent 
messages conveyed to the jury conspired to defendant's detriment, 
making it more likely that it would find that defendant was the 
aggressor. Absent this error, a better result is probable. 
Wherefore, defendant requests that he be granted a new 
trial. >K 
Dated this b day of May, 2005. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For New Trial to be delivered to 
CHOU CHOU COLLINS 
District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this day of May, 2005. /% ) 
s: 
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ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for defendant 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 18 2005 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ' Deputy cierk 
SALT LAKE DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FREEDOM YOCUM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No.041901738 FS 
Honorable LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Defendant FREEDOM YOCUM, by and through counsel Robert K. 
Heineman, pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
hereby moves this Court to grant a new trial on the basis that 
trial court comments concerning not allowing the defendant to 
demonstrate what occurred using the garden tool exhibits impinged 
on his presumption of innocence and deprived him of due process and 
a fair trial. This motion is supported by a memorandum of points 
and authorities filed concurrently. 
Dated this S day of May, 2005. 
ROBERT 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For New Trial to be delivered to 
CHOU CHOU COLLINS 
District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this day of May, 2005. 
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